What's Keeping CEOs Awake at Night?

Especially in New Jersey

Insurance Council of New Jersey 2006 Annual Symposium Iselin, NJ



June 16, 2006

Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist Insurance Information Institute • 110 William Street • New York, NY 10038 Tel: (212) 346-5520 • Fax: (212) 732-1916 • bobh@iii.org • www.iii.org

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Presentation Outline

- Catastrophe Loss Management
- Catastrophic Loss and Insurer Impairment
- P/C Profit Overview
- 2006 Hurricane Season Forecast
- Hurricane Risk in New Jersey State: Is It Real?
- Pricing Trends
- Capacity Trends
- National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
- TRIA: A Federal CAT Program That Works
- Overview of National Catastrophe Plan Proposals
 State CAT Funds: Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Funds
- Summary
- · Q&A

CATASTROPHE LOSS LOSS MANAGEMENT



Can Insurers Manage the Risk & Meet Demand?



Most of US Population & Property Has Major CAT Exposure



U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses (\$ Billions)*




*Excludes \$4B-\$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita.

Note: 2001 figure includes \$20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = \$12.2B. Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute


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New Jersey Insured Catastrophe Losses (\$ Millions)






Global Number of Catastrophic Events, 1970–2005




Insured Property Catastrophe Losses Las % Net Premiums Earned, 1983–2005E



^{*}Insurance Information Institute figure of 13.8% for 2005 based estimated 2005 DPE of \$417.7B and insured CAT losses of \$57.7B. Sources: ISO, A.M. Best, Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting; Insurance Information Institute.



Percentage of California Homeowners with Earthquake Insurance, 1994-2004*




*Includes CEA policies beginning in 1996.

Source: California Department of Insurance; Insurance Information Institute.



Number of Tornados & Associated Deaths, 1985-2005p




Source: III from National Weather Service data.


■ Number of Tornados → Tornado Deaths



2005 Was a Busy, Destructive, Deadly & Expensive Hurricane Season




Number of Major (Category 3, 4, 5) Hurricanes Striking the US by Decade



^{*}Figure for 2000s is extrapolated based on data for 2000-2005 (6 major storms: Charley, Ivan, Jeanne (2004) & Katrina, Rita, Wilma (2005)).

Source: Tillinghast from National Hurricane Center: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastint.shtm.


Top 10 Most Costly Hurricanes in US History, (Insured Losses, \$2005)



Sources: ISO/PCS; Insurance Information Institute.




Top 11 Insured Property Losses in US (\$2005)



Note: 9/11 loss figure is for property claims only. Total insured losses (\$2004) are approximately \$34B. Sources: ISO/PCS; Insurance Information Institute.



Insured Loss & Claim Count for Major Storms of 2005*




^{*}Property and business interruption losses only. Excludes offshore energy & marine losses.

Source: ISO/PCS as of June 8, 2006; Insurance Information Institute.



Inflation-Adjusted U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses By Cause of Loss, 1985-2004¹




¹ Catastrophes are all events causing direct insured losses to property of \$25 million or more in 2004 dollars. Catastrophe threshold changed from \$5 million to \$25 million beginning in 1997. Adjusted for inflation by the III. ² Excludes snow. ³ Includes hurricanes and tropical storms. ⁴ Includes other geologic events such as volcanic eruptions and other earth movement. ⁵ Does not include flood damage covered by the federally administered National Flood Insurance Program. ⁶ Includes wildland fires.

Source: Insurance Information Institute estimates based on ISO data.




Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR Worldwide






Source: AIR Worldwide




Value of Insured Residential Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR



Value of Insured Commercial Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)




Source: AIR

CATASTROPHIC LOSS & INSURER IMPAIRMENT


Is a Fund Needed to Keep til Insurers Solvent?









Reason for P/C Insolvencies (218 Insolvencies, 1993-2002)






Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2005






Source: A.M. Best: P/C Impairments Hit Near-Term Lows Despite Surging Hurricane Activity, Special Report, Nov. 2005;

FY2005 Loss as a Percentage of First Half 2005 Shareholder Equity*





Historical Ratings Distribution, US P/C Insurers, 2000 vs. 2005



Source: A.M. Best: *Rating Downgrades Slowed but Outpaced Upgrades for Fourth Consecutive Year*, Special Report, November 8, 2004 for 2000; 2006 *Review & Preview* for 2005 distribution. *Ratings 'B' and lower.



Ratings Agencies Tightening Requirements for CATs

2006 SRQ CAT Model Regs.*

- All Property Exposure
- Auto Physical Damage
- •Reinsurance Assumed
- Pools & Assessments
- All Flood Exposure
- WC Losses from Quake
- •Fire Following
- Storm Surge
- Demand Surge

Best currently estimates PML for 100-yr. wind & 250-yr. quake to determine capital adequacy

Secondary Uncertainty

ALSO "A.M. Best will perform additional "stress-tested" risk-adjusted capital analysis for a second event in order to determine the potential financial condition of an entity post a severe event."

IMPLICATION: Some insurers may be required to carry more capital to maintain the same rating.


*SRQ = Supplemental Rating Questionnaire
Source: A.M. Best Review & Preview, January 2006.

P/C FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

Do Insurers Need a tt Shock Absorber?




P/C Net Income After Taxes 1991-2005 (\$ Millions)



*ROE figures are GAAP; **Return on avg. surplus. ROAS = 9.8% after adj. for one-time special dividend paid by the investment subsidiary of one company. Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst.




ROE: P/C vs. All Industries 1987–2005



Source: Insurance Information Institute; Fortune




P/C Industry Combined Ratio






Underwriting Gain (Loss) 1975-2005



Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute




Commercial Lines Combined Ratio, 1993-2006E*






Personal Lines Combined Ratio, 1993-2006E



Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute. 2006 forecast from Fitch Ratings as of 12/7/05.

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Combined Ratio: Reinsurance vs. P/C Industry



Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Reinsurance Association of America, Insurance Information Institute




Distribution of Katrina Losses by Market (\$Billions)

Market	Percentage	Amount
Insurers	47% - 53%	\$18.8 - \$28.9
Reinsurers	52% - 44%	\$20.7 - \$24.0
Capital Markets	1% - 3%	\$0.4 - \$1.6
TOTAL	100%	\$39.9 - \$54.6

Source: Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Impact on the Insurance Industry, Tillinghast, October 2005.


A 100 Combined Ratio Isn't What it Used to Be: 95 is Where It's At



^{* 2005} figure is return on average statutory surplus.

Source: Insurance Information Institute from A.M. Best and ISO data.

Strength of Recent Hard Markets by NWP Growth*



Note: Shaded areas denote hard market periods.
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute

*2006-10 figures are III forecasts/estimates. 2005 growth of 0.4% equates to 1.8% after adjustment for a special one-time transaction between one company and its foreign parent.

The 2006 Hurricane Season:

Preview to Disaster?



Outlook for 2006 Hurricane Season

	Average*	2005	2006F
Named Storms	9.6	26	17
Named Storm Days	49.1	115.5	85
Hurricanes	5.9	14	9
Hurricane Days	24.5	47.5	45
Intense Hurricanes	2.3	7	5
Intense Hurricane Days	13	7	13
Net Tropical Cyclone Activity	100%	275%	195%

Source: Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, May 31, 2006.

^{*}Average over the period 1950-2000.



Probability of Major Hurricane Landfall (CAT 3, 4, 5) in 2006

	Average*	2006F
Entire US Coast	52%	82%
US East Coast Including Florida Peninsula	31%	69%
Gulf Coast from FL Panhandle to Brownsville, TX	30%	38%

ALSO...Above-Average Major Hurricane Landfall Risk in Caribbean for 2006

Source: Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, May 31, 2006.


^{*}Average over past century.



Probability of Major Hurricane Landfall (CAT 3, 4, 5) in 2006

			2005
	NOAA	CSU	Actual
Number Named Storms	13-16	17	28
Number of Hurricanes	8-10	9	15
Number of Major Hurricanes (Category 3+)	4-6	5	7

CAT Models for 2006 Show Increase in Hurricane Frequency & Severity




Hurricane Risk in New Jersey

Is it Real?






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Atlantic County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Bergen County, NJ, 1900-2002



NOTE: Population values may be missing in some counties, particularly for earlier periods. This is most often attributable to the fact that the county had not yet been established.




Historical Hurricane Strikes in Burlington County, NJ, 1900-2002



NOTE: Population values may be missing in some counties, particularly for earlier periods. This is most often attributable to the fact that the county had not yet been established.




Historical Hurricane Strikes in Cape May County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Cumberland County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Hudson County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Middlesex County, NJ, 1900-2002



NOTE: Population values may be missing in some counties, particularly for earlier periods. This is most often attributable to the fact that the county had not yet been established.




Historical Hurricane Strikes in Monmouth County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Ocean County, NJ, 1900-2002






Historical Hurricane Strikes in Salem County, NJ, 1900-2002





Hurricane Nightmare Scenario for the Northeast: \$100B+ Insured Losses




- •Strong CAT 3 or weak CAT 4 could cause \$100B+ in loss in the densely populated Northeast
- •NJ, NYC and Long Island could expect significant flood damage to property and infrastructure

Source: AIR Worldwide




NY Hurricane Risk Data in a More Realistic Context



Source: Based on data provided by the NOAA Tropical Prediction Center




HURISK Results for Hurricanes Passing Within 75 NM of NYC: 1870 - 2004





Track of "Long Island Express" Storm of 1938



Source: WeatherUnderground.com, accessed February 4, 2006.




Damage Caused by "Long Island Express" Hurricane of 1938

- 700 deaths, 708 injured
- 4,500 homes, cottages, farms destroyed; 15,000 damaged
- 26,000 destroyed automobiles
- 20,000 miles of electrical power and telephone lines downed
- 1,700 livestock and up to 750,000 chickens killed
- \$2,610,000 worth of fishing boats, equipment, docks, and shore plants damaged or destroyed
- Half the entire apple crop destroyed at a cost of \$2 million




Storm Season of 1944: A Busy one for the Northeast



Source: WeatherUnderground.com, accessed May 31, 2006; NOAA loss & fatality figures & ProtectingNJ.org.




Storm Season of 1954: The Northeast Hit Again



Source: WeatherUnderground.com, accessed May 31, 2006; NOAA loss & fatality figures.


Storm Season of 1960: Brenda & Donna Came to Visit



Source: WeatherUnderground.com, accessed May 31, 2006; NOAA loss & fatality figures.



After a 25 Hiatus, Hurricane Gloria Hit in 1985




Source: WeatherUnderground.com, accessed May 31, 2006; NOAA loss & fatality figures.

Hurricane Season of 2005

Breakdown of Losses: Katrina

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Hurricane Katrina <u>Insured</u> Loss Distribution by State (\$ Millions)*



*As of June 8, 2006


Source: PCS division of ISO.

Hurricane Katrina Loss LL Distribution by Line (\$ Billions)*

Commercial

\$20.847.0,52%

Total insured losses are estimated at **\$40.579** billion from 1.7438 million claims. Excludes \$2-\$3B in offshore energy losses




*As of June 8, 2006


Source: PCS division of ISO.



Hurricane Katrina Claim Count Distribution by State*




Property Damage from Hurricane Katrina Flood & Storm Surge (\$ Millions)*




*Value of property damage by flood and storm surge whether or not insured. Source: AIR Worldwide, September 29, 2005.

Hurricane Rita Loss Distribution, by Line (\$ Millions)*



\$1,861.2,37%

Total insured losses are estimated at \$5.0 billion (excl. offshore energy of \$2-\$3B) from 383,000 claims.




\$2,974.2,59%

*As of June 8, 2006

Source: PCS division of ISO.



Hurricane Rita Claim Count Distribution by State*



Louisiana accounted for 48.3% of the insured losses, Texas 44.6%.


Excludes offshore energy losses of \$2-3B

*As of June 8, 2006

Source: PCS division of ISO.

Hurricane Wilma Loss Distribution by Line (\$ Millions)*

losses are estimated at \$10.3 billion from 1.047 million claims




*As of June 8, 2006. All losses are in FL. Source: PCS division of ISO.



Hurricane Wilma Claim Count Distribution by Line*






*As of June 8, 2006. All losses are in FL. Source: PCS division of ISO.

Hurricane Ophelia Loss Distribution by Line (\$ Millions)*

Total insured losses are estimated at \$35.0 million from 10,600 claims




Homeowners, \$27.0 , 77%

*As of June 8, 2006. All losses are in NC. Source: PCS division of ISO.



Hurricane Ophelia Claim Count Distribution by Line*



*As of June 8, 2006. All losses are in NC. Source: PCS division of ISO.


PRICING

Can Discipline be Maintained?






Average Expenditures on Homeowners Insurance



*Insurance Information Institute Estimates/Forecasts Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute


Percent of Commercial Accounts Renewing w/Positive Rate Changes, 1st Qtr. 2006




Source: Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers



Reinsurance Prices Surged in 2006 Following Record CATs in 2005



Percent of Commercial Property Accounts Renewing Negative, 1st Qtr. 2006



Source:; Insurance Information Institute from Council of Insurance Agents and Broker data.

CAPACITY

Is There Enough Capital to Fund Mega-Losses?





U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2005*

Capacity TODAY is \$427.1B, 9.2% above year-end 2004, 47% above its 2002 trough and 22% above its mid-1999 peak. Sufficient capacity exists to pay all hurricane claims.

Foreign reinsurance and residual market mechanisms absorbed \$27-\$32B (57%-67%) of 2005 CAT losses of \$57.7B

"Surplus" is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to "Owners Equity" or "Net Worth" in non-insurance organizations



Announced Insurer Capital Raising* (\$ Millions, as of December 1, 2005)




*Existing (re) insurers. Announced amounts may differ from sums actually raised. Sources: Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Company Reports; Insurance Information Institute.



Announced Capital Raising by Insurance Start-Ups

(\$ Millions, as of April 15, 2006)



^{*}Chubb, Trident are funding Harbor Point. Announced amounts may differ from sums actually raised. **Stated amount is \$750 million to \$1 billion. ***XL Capital/Hedge Fund venture. Arrow Capital formed by Goldman Sachs.


Sources: Morgan Stanley, Company Reports; Insurance Information Institute.

INSURANCE-TO-VALUE:

Ending the Blame Game is a Win-Win Situation Deal




Insurance-to-Value in HO is a National Problem, Improved Recently



Source: Marshall & Swift/Boeckh

Who's Responsibility Is It to Keep Homeowners Policy Up-to-Date?




- •Nearly 3 out 4 people, even fire-weary Californians, believe it is the homeowner's responsibility to keep insurance up-to-date
- •BUT 26% believe it's the <u>agent's</u> or <u>insurer's</u> responsibility
- •This substantial minority is wrong, but gets heard (CA, FL) and comments reflect badly on insurers
- •Media, regulators and legislators join fray

Source: September 2004 poll of 800 Californians conducted for the Insurance Information Network of California by Public Opinion Strategies. Margin of error = +/- 3.46%.



Time Since Homeowner Last Updated HO Policy



Source: September 2004 poll of 800 Californians conducted for the Insurance Information Network of California by Public Opinion Strategies. Margin of error = +/- 3.46%.



Why People Don't Increase Homeowners Coverage



- •22% cite expense as reason they don't adjust they're HO coverage
- •25% don't realize they need to
- •30% say they're too busy (to think about protecting their most valuable asset)
- •25% say their agent said there's nothing to worry about


Source: Harris interactive poll conducted for Fireman's Fund, July 2004. See: http://www.firemansfund.com/dcmssites/about/pdf/firemansfundtoplinerev2.pdf

National Flood Insurance Program

Does the NFIP Help or Hurt the CAT Problem?



Flood Insurance Penetration Rates: Top 25 Counties/Parishes in US*




*As of 12/31/05.

Source: New Orleans Times-Picayune, 3/19/06, from NFIP and US Census Bureau data.



Flood Insurance Penetration Rates: Counties/Parishes Ranked 26-50*




*As of 12/31/05.

Source: New Orleans Times-Picayune, 3/19/06, from NFIP and US Census Bureau data.



Flood Insurance Penetration Rates: Counties/Parishes Ranked 51-75*



*As of 12/31/05.

Source: New Orleans Times-Picayune, 3/19/06, from NFIP and US Census Bureau data.



Repeat NFIP Flood Losses Cost Taxpayers Big Bucks & Enable Poor Building Decisions

	Number	Taxpayer Cost
Repetitive Loss Properties	122,000	\$7.6 billion
Repetitive Loss Properties,		
Louisiana	25,000	\$1.9 billion
Four or More Losses	22,500	\$1.6 billion
Payments Exceeded		
Property Values	4,600	\$400 million

Source: Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2006, p. A14, from National Wildlife Federation.

TERRORISM

A Risk to the NY Metro Area






Insurance Industry Retention Under TRIA (\$ Billions)



Source: Insurance Information Institute



Terrorism Coverage Take-Up Rate Rising



Source: Marsh, Inc.; Insurance Information Institute


Insured Loss Estimates: Large CNBR Terrorist Attack (\$ Bill)

Type of Coverage	New York	Washington	San Francisco	Des Moines
Group Life	\$82.0	\$22.5	\$21.5	\$3.4
General Liability	14.4	2.9	3.2	0.4
Workers Comp	483.7	126.7	87.5	31.4
Residential Prop.	38.7	12.7	22.6	2.6
Commercial Prop.	158.3	31.5	35.5	4.1
Auto	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.4
TOTAL	\$778.1	\$196.8	\$171.2	\$42.3

Source: American Academy of Actuaries, Response to President's Working Group, Appendix II, April 26, 2006.



Surplus Under TRIA/TRIEA Covered Lines



^{*2006} figure uses 2005 estimated year-end surplus and premiums by line as basis for calculations. Source: Insurance Information Institute.

Insured Loss Estimates: Medium CNBR Terrorist Attack (\$ Bill)

Type of Coverage	New York	Washington	San Francisco	Des Moines
Group Life	\$37.7	\$22.5	\$21.5	\$3.4
General Liability	7.3	2.9	3.2	0.4
Workers Comp	313.2	126.7	87.5	31.4
Residential Prop.	10.3	12.7	22.6	2.6
Commercial Prop.	77.8	31.5	35.5	4.1
Auto	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.4
TOTAL	\$446.5	\$106.2	\$92.2	\$27.3

Source: American Academy of Actuaries, Response to President's Working Group, Appendix II, April 26, 2006.



Insured Loss Estimates: Truck Bomb Terrorist Attack (\$ Bill)

Type of Coverage	New York	Washington	San Francisco	Des Moines
Group Life	\$0.3	\$0.2	\$0.3	\$0.1
General Liability	1.2	0.4	0.7	0.2
Workers Comp	3.5	2.8	3.9	1.5
Residential Prop.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Commercial Prop.	6.8	2.1	3.9	1.2
Auto	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	\$11.8	\$5.5	\$8.8	\$3.0


Source: American Academy of Actuaries, Response to President's Working Group, Appendix II, April 26, 2006.

Overview of Plans for a National Catastrophe Insurance Plan





Government Aid After Major Disasters (Billions)*



Source: United States Senate Budget Committee, Insurance Information Institute as of 12/31/05.



NAIC's Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan

- Proposes Layered Approach to Risk
- Layer 1: Maximize resources of private insurance & reinsurance industry
 - Includes "All Perils" Residential Policy
 - Encourage Mitigation
 - Create Meaningful, Forward-Looking Reserves
- Layer 2: Establishes system of state catastrophe funds (like FHCF)
- Layer 3: Federal Catastrophe Reinsurance Mechanism

Source: Insurance Information Institute




Guiding Principles of NAIC's National Catastrophe Plan

- National program should promote personal responsibility among policyholders
- National program should support reasonable building codes, development plans & mitigation tools
- National program should maximize riskbearing capacity of private markets, and
- National plan should provide quantifiable risk management to the federal government

Source: Insurance Information Institute from NAIC, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a Comprehensive National Plan, Dec. 1, 2005.



Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan Schematic



Source: NAIC, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a Comprehensive National Plan, Dec. 1, 2005; Insurance Information. Inst.



Legislation: Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan

- H.R. 846: Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 2005
 - > Introduced by Representative Ginny Brown-Waite (R-FL)
 - > Requires Treasury to implement a reinsurance program offering contracts sold at regional auctions
- H.R. 4366: Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2005
 - > Also worked on by Rep. Brown-Waite
 - Establishes national commission on catastrophe preparation and protection
 - > Authorizes sale of federally-backed reinsurance contracts to state catastrophe funds
- H.R. 2668: Policyholder Disaster Protection Act of 2005
 - ➤ Backed by Rep. Mark Foley (R-FL)
 - > Amends IRS code to permit insurers to establish tax-deductible reserve funds for catastrophic events
 - > 20-year phase-in for maximum reserve
 - > Use limited to declared disasters

Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute

Legislation: Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan (cont'd)

- S. 3114: Nelson-Landrieu Bill (2006)
 - ➤ Introduced by Senators Bill Nelson (D-FL) Mary Landrieu (D-LA)
 - ➤ Calls for creation of bipartisan panel of experts to examine specific proposals before Congress to create federal disaster reinsurance program & that would allow homeowners to set aside tax-exempt cash reserves to pay deductibles and other out-of-pocket disaster-related expenses
- IN NEW JERSEY: A. 3236 (June 1, 2006)
 - ➤ Intro. by Assemblyman Mike Panter (D-Monmouth/Mercer)
 - **➤** Would create state CAT fund in New Jersey

Source: Insurance Information Institute



Layer 1: The Insurance Contract, Enhancing Capacity & Shaping the Risk

- All Perils Policy
 - > No exclusion except acts of war
 - ➤ Contains standard deductibles of \$500 \$1000 but requires separate CAT deductible of 2% 10% of insured value; Consumer could buy down the deductible to non-CAT fixed dollar amount
- Encouraging Mitigation
 - Policy will provide meaningful discounts for effective mitigation measures
- Creating Meaningful, Forward-Looking Reserves
 - > Change tax law to allow insurers to set aside a share of premiums paid by policyholders as a reserve for future events
 - > Amount set aside would be actuarially based
 - > Phased-in to maximum reserve over 20 years
 - > Use limited to declared disasters




Layer 2: State Level Public/Private Partnership (State CAT Fund)

- Requirement to Create Fund
 - To participate in national fund, states must establish state CAT fund or participate in regional CAT fund
 - Funds responsible for managing capacity of their funds up to costs expected for combined 1-in-50 year CAT loss level
- Operation of State/Regional CAT Funds
 - >Operating structures left to states' discretion, including
 - Financing mechanism (e.g., debt, pool etc.)
 - Trigger point for qualifying loss (if any)
 - Amount of retention between private insurers & state fund
 - Participation by surplus lines & residual markets
 - > Requirement that rates are actuarially sound
 - Requirement that fund will finance a level of mitigation education and implementation



Schematic of Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (2006)



Source: FHCF, September 2005.



Layer 2: State Level Public/Private Partnership (State CAT Fund) [Cont'd]

Building Codes

- > Participating states expected to establish effective (enforced) building codes that properly reflect their CAT exposures as well as the latest in accepted science and engineering
- > States also required to develop high land use plans where appropriate

Anti-Fraud Measures

>State funds and DOIs maintain rigorous anti-fraud programs to ensure losses paid actaully due to insured CAT loss

Mitigation

- >DOIs required to establish & implement effective mitigation plans
- > Review of mitigation plans will be considered as part of an NAIC certification process


Layer 3: The Role of a National Mechanism

- The National Catastrophe Plan Mechanism
 - ➤ Federal legislation is needed to create a National Catastrophe Insurance Commission (NCIC)
 - NCIC purpose is to serve as conduit between state funds and US
 Treasury for purpose of providing reinsurance to state funds for
 insured losses resulting from catastrophic events beyind the state mandated 1-in-50 year exposure
 - > States & NCIC will enter into National Catastrophe Financing Contracts
 - Reinsurance will attach at 1-in-50 year level and provide protection through the 1-in-500 year level event

Layer 3: [Cont'd] The Role of a National Mechanism

- The National Catastrophe Insurance Commission Structure & Duties
 - > NCIC would annually establish actuarially sound rates, with no profit factor, for each state's aggregate catastrophic exposure
 - > State fund responsible for collecting premium and remitting to NCIC.
 - > NCIC remits premiums to US Treasury general revenues
 - No separate fund is created, nor are any funds accumulated
 - In the event of a loss, US Treasury provides funds pursuant to catastrophe financing contract
 - > NCIC will consist of 11 members serving 6-year terms
 - 1 member from each of 4 NAIC zones, 1 US Treasury rep., remainder are to be experts in actuarial science, engineering, meteorological/seismic science, consumer affairs & p/c insurance
 - Members are selected by the President & confirmed by the Senate with chair appointed by the President

Interaction of State Funds, National Commission & US Treasury



Source: NAIC, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a Comprehensive National Plan, Dec. 1, 2005; Insurance Information. Inst.



Pros/Cons of Federal CAT (Re) Insurance Facility

- Rationale FOR Federal Involvement
 - > Insurance was not meant to handle mega-catastrophes
 - > Such risks are fundamentally uninsurable
 - Federal government already heavily involved in insuring against weather-related mega-catastrophes (e.g., flood, crop)
 - ➤ Insurers are not allowed to charge risk appropriate rates (including rising reinsurance costs)
 - > Price/availability of private reinsurance is volatile
- Rationale AGAINST Federal Involvement
 - > Crowds-out pvt. insurance/reinsurance markets; stifles innovation
 - > Relationship between price and risk assumed is diminished since fed insurance programs are seldom actuarially sound
 - ➤ Increases federal involvement and regulatory authority in p/c insurance (not a negative for some market participants)
 - Cost to US Treasury (esp. taxpayers in less disaster prone states)
 - ➤ Diminishes incentives for mitigation, tougher building codes and wiser land use policies if Fed rate are politically influenced




Proponents/Opponents of National Catastrophe Plan


- Proponents of a National Catastrophe Plan
 - > Some major personal lines insurers: Allstate, State Farm
 - ➤ Insurance regulators from some CAT-prone states: FL, CA as well as NY (but not TX)
 - ➤ Some elected officials in state legislatures & Congress, esp. from disaster-prone states like FL
 - > Coalition building on-going (ProtectingAmerica.org)
- Opponents of a National Catastrophe Plan
 - ➤ Reinsurers, American Insurance Association, numerous large insurers both domestic and foreign, mutual and stock
 - > Many smaller insurers concerned about federal intrusion into the p/c regulatory arena
 - > Many insurers operating outside areas prone to major CAT risk
 - > Some/many regulators in states not prone to major catastrophic risk
 - ➤ Likely opposition among legislators and policymakers in Washington opposed to deeper involvement of government in p/c insurance sector



Notable & Quotable...

- "People who willingly and knowingly live in catastrophe-prone areas should assume the risk, and cost, of doing so; government-subsidized insurance just loads the risk, and cost, on average taxpayers."
 - Edmund F. Kelly, CEO, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2006)





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CHOOSE YOUR STATE: California | New York | New Jersey

National Co-Chair Federal Emergency Management Agency fficer, International Code Council

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M. LOY, National Co-Chair

Regional Natural Disaster Pool(s)

• KEY ELEMENTS

- > Share of property premiums in certain states (homeowners, commercial property) premiums collected would be ceded to pool and used to finance mega-catastrophes in participating states
- > Funds would earn investment income tax-free to speed accumulation
- Federal government would provide a backstop to the pool as:
 - Reinsurance purchased by pool from the government
 - Line of credit offset by assessing authority

• KEY CHALLENGES

- > Is participation by insureds mandatory or optional?
- > If optional, significant adverse selection problem
- > Determination of "actuarially sound" rates
- > Maintaining role for private reinsurance
- > Keeping rates free of political influence and manipulation
- Formula for assessing shortfalls in pool (including taxpayer share)
- > Attracting support of states not prone to mega-catastrophes
- > Appearing deficit hawks, advocates of small government.

Federal Reinsurance Program

KEY ELEMENTS

➤ Insurers purchase CAT reinsurance from federal government

KEY CHALLENGES

- > Determination of "actuarially sound" rates
- > Maintaining significant role for private reinsurers
- > Maintaining significant role for ART and risk securitization
- > Keeping rates free of political influence and manipulation
- > Appeasing advocates of small government
- ➤ Keeping natural disaster risk programs separate and distinct from terrorism risk

Tax-Preferred Treatment of Pre-Event Catastrophe Reserving

KEY ELEMENTS

- Insurers would be allowed to deduct from their taxable income amounts set aside in reserve for natural disaster risks in advance of the occurrence of the actual event
- > Presently, US tax law does not allow for such treatment
 - Most other countries already permit pre-event reserving

KEY CHALLENGES

- > Determination of appropriate reserve levels
- > Overcoming criticism of impact on US Treasury receipts
 - Note that impact on Treasury is limited to time value of tax receipts

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Summary

- Industry results are fundamentally strong except in property lines in CAT-prone areas
- Premium growth is very sluggish/negative except for CAT-exposed property lines/territories
- NJ has 5th largest coastal property exposure in US & largest exposure to terrorism
- CAT Fund argument unlikely to be resolved by the current Congress
- States haven't taken steps to form own CAT funds
- Insurers, lawmakers, regulators deeply divided
 - Lack of unity, current profitability & rising capacity & Administration's political philosophy hurt chances for a national CAT fund in the near future



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