Insurance & Coastal Risk in Florida

An Economic Analysis

Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 7th Annual Participating Insurers Workshop Orlando, FL

June 7, 2007

Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, President & Chief Economist Insurance Information Institute

110 William Street
New York, NY 10038 Tel: (212) 346-5520
Fax: (212) 732-1916
bobh@iii.org
www.iii.org

iii

Presentation Outline

- Review of Florida Hurricane Risk: An Insurance Industry Perspective
- Florida Exposure Analysis
 How Bad is It?
 Could it Get Any Worse?
- Are Florida's Development Patterns Rational?
 Examination of Stakeholder Incentives
- How Insurers Signal What Should be Built & Where
 Private vs. Government-run Insurers
- Role of Risk Perception
- What Works, What Doesn't
- Overview of a National Catastrophe Plan
- State-Run Plans
- Recommendations

Review of Florida Hurricane Risk:

An Insurance Industry Perspective



U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses*



*Excludes \$4B-\$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita. <u>Note</u>: 2001 figure includes \$20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = \$12.2B. Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute



Source: HURDAT database; Insurance Information Institute.

Top 10 Most Costly Hurricanes in US History, (Insured Losses, \$2005)



Sources: ISO/PCS; Insurance Information Institute.

Inflation-Adjusted U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses By Cause of Loss, 1986-20051



 ¹ Catastrophes are all events causing direct insured losses to property of \$25 million or more in 2005 dollars. Catastrophe threshold changed from \$5 million to \$25 million beginning in 1997. Adjusted for inflation by the III.
 ² Excludes snow. ³ Includes hurricanes and tropical storms. ⁴ Includes other geologic events such as volcanic eruptions and other earth movement. ⁵ Does not include flood damage covered by the federally administered National Flood Insurance Program. ⁶ Includes wildland fires.

Source: Insurance Services Office (ISO)..

Insured Losses from Top 10 Hurricanes Since 1990 & Katrina Adjusted for Inflation, Growth in Coastal Properties, Real Growth in Property Values & Increased Property Insurance Coverage



*ISO/PCS estimate as of October 10, 2005.

Source: Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Impact on the Insurance Industry, Tillinghast, October 2005; Insurance Info. Institute.

Hurricane Damage from Top 10 Hurricanes Since 1900 Adjusted for Inflation, Growth in Coastal Properties, Real Growth in Property Values*



*Includes damage form wind and storm surge but generally excludes inland flooding. Source: Roger Pielke and Christopher Landsea, December 2005; Insurance Info. Institute.



Florida Homeowners Insurance Market Share (As of 12/31/06)



*Computed based in direct premiums written (DPW). Actual exposure to hurricane loss may differ due to reinsurance purchased and location of risk.

Source: Fitch Ratings, Hurricane Season 2007: A Desk Reference for Investors, June 1, 2007.

Florida Residential Insurance Admitted Market Breakdown



Source: Citizens Property Insurance Corp.

Florida Property Insurance Market Breakdown (as of 12/31/05)

Residential

Commercial



Source: Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corp.; Insurance Info, Institute.



*Could be as high as 12,000 **Could be as high as 3,000 ***Midpoint of 1,000 – 2,000 range ****Associated Press total as of Dec. 11, 2005. *****Midpoint of 1,100-1,400 range. Sources: NOAA; Insurance Information Institute.

Total NFIP Claim Payments by State (Top 10) Jan 1, 1978 - Dec. 2004



Source: FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

Outlook for 2007 Hurricane Season: 85% Worse Than Average

	Average*	2005	2007F
Named Storms	9.6	28	17
Named Storm Days	49.1	115.5	85
Hurricanes	5.9	14	9
Hurricane Days	24.5	47.5	40
Intense Hurricanes	2.3	7	5
Intense Hurricane Days	5	7	11
Accumulated Cyclone Energy	96.2	NA	170
Net Tropical Cyclone Activity	100%	275%	185%

*Average over the period 1950-2000.

Source: Philip Klotzbach and Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, May 31, 2007.

Probability of Major HurricaneLandfall (CAT 3, 4, 5) in 2007

	Average*	2007F
Entire US Coast	52%	74%
US East Coast Including Florida Peninsula	31%	50%
Gulf Coast from FL Panhandle to Brownsville, TX	30%	49%

ALSO...Above-Average Major Hurricane Landfall Risk in Caribbean for 2007

*Average over the period 1950-2000.

Source: Philip Klotzbach and Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, May 31, 2007.

Number of Major (Category 3, 4, 5) Hurricanes Striking the US by Decade



*Figure for 2000s is extrapolated based on data for 2000-2005 (6 major storms: Charley, Ivan, Jeanne (2004) & Katrina, Rita, Wilma (2005)).

Source: Tillinghast from National Hurricane Center: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastint.shtm.

Florida Hurricane Exposure Analysis:

How Bad Is It? (Bad) Could It Get Any Worse? (Yes)

Total Value of InsuredCoastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR Worldwide

Insured Coastal Exposure as a % of Statewide Insured Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR Worldwide

Value of Insured Residential Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR

Value of Insured Commercial Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)



Source: AIR

Florida for Sale: 24/7/365



Florida oceanfront real estate is advertised for sale throughout the country year round, like these ads from the New York Times and Wall Street Journal



Florida for Sale: 24/7/365



New Condo Construction in South Miami Beach, 2007-2009

- Number of New Developments: 15
- Number of Individual Units: 2,111
- Avg. Price of Cheapest Unit: \$940,333
- Avg. Price of Most Expensive Unit: \$6,460,000
- Range: \$395,000 \$16,000,000
- Overall Average Price per Unit: \$3,700,167*
- Aggregate Property Value: At least \$6 Billion

*Based on average of high/low value for each of the 15 developments Source: Insurance Information Institute from <u>www.miamicondolifestyle.com</u> accessed April 5, 2007.



Great Miami Hurricane of 1926: Hurricane Damage Adjusted for Inflation, Growth in Coastal Properties, Real Growth in Property Values*





\$500

*Includes damage form wind and storm surge but generally excludes inland flooding. Source: Roger Pielke and Christopher Landsea, December 2005; Insurance Info. Institute.

FINANCIAL STRENGTH & RATINGS **Industry Has Weathered** the Storms Well iii

Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2005

2003-2005

<u>1969-2005</u>



Source: A.M. Best: P/C Impairments Hit Near-Term Lows Despite Surging Hurricane Activity, Special Report, Nov. 2005;



Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

P/C Insurer Impairment Frequency vs. Combined Ratio, 1969-2006



Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

The Insurance Economics of Florida Hurricanes

Drivers of Private Insurer Behavior in Florida

FLORIDA HURRICANES & UNDERWRITING PERFORMANCE:

Homeowners Insurers Have Lost Billions in Florida

Underwriting Gain (Loss) in Florida Homeowners Insurance, 1992-2006E*



*2005 estimate by Insurance Information Institute based on historical loss and expense data for FL adjusted for estimated 2005 residential windstorm losses of \$7.35B. 2006 estimate from Ins. Info. Inst.

Cumulative Underwriting Gain (Loss) in Florida Homeowners Insurance, 1992-2006E*



*2005 estimate by Insurance Information Institute based on historical loss and expense data for FL adjusted for estimated 2005 residential windstorm losses of \$7.35B. 2006 estimate from Ins. Info. Inst.



Source: NAIC



Source: NAIC; 200/6 US and FL estimates from the Insurance Information Institute.
Major Residual Market Plan Estimated Deficits 2004/2005 (Millions of Dollars)



* MWUA est. deficit for 2005 comprises \$545m in assessments plus \$50m in Federal Aid. Source: Insurance Information Institute

CAPITAL & CAPACITY CONSIDERATIONS:

INSURERS MUST PUT LARGE AMOUNTS OF CAPITAL AT RISK TO OFFER INSURANCE IN FLORIDA



(actual rate for period 1996-2003).

Source: Insurance Information Institute

Estimated Cumulative New Insurance Capital Required to Support Growth in FL Homeownership, 2005-2015*



Source: Insurance Information Institute

Are Florida's Development Patterns Rational?



Excessive Catastrophe Exposure: Outcome of Economically & Politically Rational Decision Process?

Property Owners

- Make economically rational decision to live in disaster-prone areas
- Low cost of living, low real estate prices & rapid appreciation, low/no income tax, low property tax, rapid job growth
- Government-run insurers (e.g., CPIC, NFIP) provide implicit subsidies by selling insurance at below-market prices with few underwriting restrictions
- Government aid, tax deductions, litigation recovery for uninsured losses
- ➢ No fear of death and injury

Local Zoning/Permitting Authorities

- > Allowing development is economically & politically rational & fiscally sound
- Residential construction creates jobs, attracts wealth, increases tax receipts, stimulates commercial construction & permanent jobs, develops infrastructure
- Increases local representation in state legislature & political influence
- Property and infrastructure damage costs shifted to others (state and federal taxpayers, policyholders in unaffected areas)

Developers

- Coastal development is a high-margin business
- Financial interest reduced to zero after sale

Source: Insurance Information Institute.

Excessive Catastrophe Exposure: Outcome of Economically & Politically Rational Decision Process?

State Legislators

- Loathe to pass laws negatively impacting development in home districts
- Local development benefits local economy and enhances political influence
- Rapid development lessens need for higher income and property taxes
- Can redistribute CAT losses to unaffected policyholders and taxpayers
- Can suppress insurance prices via state insurance regulator, suppress pricing and weaken underwriting standards in state-run insurer & redistribute losses

Congressional Delegation

- Home state development increases influence in Washington
 - Political representation, share of federal expenditures
- Loathe to pass laws harming development in home state/district
- Tax law promotes homeownership and actually produces supplemental benefits for property owners in disaster-prone areas
- Large amounts of unbudgeted disaster aid easily authorized
- Tax burden largely borne by those outside CAT zone & those with no representation (children & unborn)

• President

- Presidential disaster declarations and associated aid are increasing
- Political benefits to making declarations and distributing large amounts of aid
- Direct impact on favorability ratings & election outcomes
- Losses can be distributed to other areas and the unrepresented Source: Insurance Information Institute.

How Insurers Signal What Should be Built and Where



Government-Run Insurers Lead to Poor Land Use/Design Decisions

- Government-run insurers (markets of last resort) serve as a vital safety valve after major market disruptions, but also serve as an enabler of unwise development...
- Government-run property insurers wash away market-based signals about relative risk
- Consequence is runaway development in disaster-prone areas
- Government-run insurers:
 - Generally fail to charge actuarially sound rates
 - Have weak underwriting standards
 - > Are thinly capitalized
 - Can assess losses to policyholders other than their own
 - Vulnerable to political pressure
- Inadequate premiums, insufficient capital and weak underwriting mean that most government plans, from Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to the National Flood Insurance Program operate with frequent deficits

Negative Outcomes from Flaws in Government-Run Insurers

- True risk associated with building on a particular piece of property is obscured
- Subsidies are generated leading to market distortions/inequities:
 - Many thousands of homes likely would not have been built (or built differently) if property owner obligated to pay actuarially sound rates
 - CPIC assessments from Wilma will require grandmothers living in trailer parks on fixed incomes in Gainesville to subsidize million dollar homes in Marco Island via assessment (surcharges).
- Serial rebuilding in disaster-prone areas is the norm
- Property owners come to assume that the government rate is the "fair" rate and object to moves to actuarially sound rates.
- Government-run insurer can't control its own exposure
 - Legislature mandates that CPIC offer coverage in most cases if no private insurer will offer coverage due to high risk, near certainty of destruction
 - No restrictions on value of property, so high-valued properties represent disproportionate share of potential loss
- Taxpayer Burden: NFIP borrowed \$20B+ in 2005



Risk Perception

Is Disaster Risk Factored into the Buy/Build/Move Decision?



Average Annual Population Growth Rates of Atlantic States, 1960-1980 & 1980-2003



Average Annual Population Growth Rates of Atlantic States, 1960-1980 & 1980-2003



Average Annual Population Growth Rates of Gulf Coast States, 1960-1980 & 1980-2003



Average Annual Population Growth Rates of Florida Coastal Cities, 1990-2003



State Population Growth Rates by Decade, Gulf Coast, 1980-2003 **1980-1990** 🗆 **1990-2000** 2000-2003 **Florida has posted** 28.40% the fastest growth of any Gulf Coast state since 1980, driving 21.00% 20.50% its exposure to hurricane loss



Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, US Census Bureau

Projected Percent Population Growth of Atlantic States, 2003-2030



Projected Percent Population Growth of Atlantic States, 2003-2030



Projected Percent Population Growth of Gulf Coast States, 2003-2030





What Works, What Doesn't



Successful Tools for Controlling Hurricane Exposure

- Strengthened building codes
- Stringent enforcement of building codes
- Fortified home programs
- Insurance rates based on sound actuarial principles (risk-based rates that are not government controlled); Works for commercial insurers
- Disciplined underwriting
- Removing impediments to capital flows
- Incentives to adopt mitigation
- Forcing communities to consider and take a larger stake in their catastrophe exposure

Source: Insurance Information Institute

Unsuccessful Tools for Controlling Hurricane Exposure

- Insurance rates that are not actuarially sound (i.e., don't reflect true risk)
- Political interference in rate process
- Inadequate underwriting controls
- Subsidies

Intra-state (policyholders/taxpayers)
US Taxpayer

- Voluntary flood coverage
- Litigation

Source: Insurance Information Institute

Faux Pas & Fatal Flaws in Florida's Approach to Managing CAT Risk

FAUX PAS

- Governor has unnecessarily, unjustifiably and counterproductively vilified private insurers and reinsurers
 - Insurers want to find ways to cover the majority of hurricane-exposed property in FL and will do so if given the opportunity
 - Insurers and capital markets can be partners in finding lasting and innovative solutions to Florida's permanent hurricane problem
- Changes to market are arbitrary, capricious and punitive and violate virtually all laws of modern economics, finance, statistics and actuarial science
- Meteorological and actuarial reality have been forced to take a back seat to politics
- Political risk to insurers now *exceeds* hurricane risk
- Bottom Line: Residents of Florida are Now the Most Financially Exposed People on Earth to Catastrophic Risk

Faux Pas & Fatal Flaws in Florida's Approach to Managing CAT Risk

FATAL FLAWS

- Virtually no diversification
 - Basically monoline, single state, single risk
- No true spread of risk
 - Citizens market share is concentrated in riskiest areas
 - **FHCF is Citizen's sole reinsurer; FHCF doesn't access retrocessional mkt.**
- Rates in Citizens not even remotely close to actuarially sound
- Citizens & FHCF are too thinly capitalized
- Losses are substantially funded via post-event assessment
- Plants seeds of animosity between non-coastal & coastal dwellers (within state and with non-coastal states)
 - Largest beneficiaries are residents of southeast coast
- Plan will alienate business community (liability lines assessed)
- Homeowners insurance has been converted into a regressive income and wealth transfer mechanism
- May have harmed chances for Fed Natural Catastrophe Fund
- Little done to address true risk of hurricanes

iii

Problem Issues

- Local control of land use and permitting creates significant incentive problems
 - Benefits accrue locally while many costs can be redistributed to others via taxes, insurance and aid
- Prospect of government aid reinforces unsound building and location decisions
- States don't want to raise taxes to pay for mitigation/prevention even if state is sole beneficiary

≻E.g., NO levees; Beach replenishment

Source: Insurance Information Institute





1-in-20 1-in-30 1-in-50 1-in-70 1-in-85 1-in-100 1-in-250

Notes: Pre-event funding includes funds available to Citizens, FHCF and private carriers plus contingent funding available through private reinsurance to pay claims in 2007. Post-event funding is on a present value basis and does not include financing costs. Probabilities are expressed as "odds of a single storm of this magnitude or greater happening in 2007." Source: Tillinghast Towers Perrin, *Study of Recent Legislative Changes to Florida's Property Insurance Mechanisms*, 3/07.



Per Household Savings vs. Long-Term Costs of FL Legislation for 2007 Hurricane Season



Notes: Assumes average homeowners insurance premium of \$1300 in 2007. Savings for 2007 reflects 24.3% savings on hurricane costs, assumed to be 63% of premium. Savings based on statewide OIR estimate. Actual savings may be less. Direct costs include assessments paid by policyholders on home and personal auto premiums. Indirect costs include assessments on commercial lines passed on to policyholders via higher prices. Amounts are in nominal dollars, or the total cost of borrowing including finance charges over the term of the bond.

Source: Tillinghast Towers Perrin, Study of Recent Legislative Changes to Florida's Property Insurance Mechanisms, 3/07.

Average Annual Assessment per Household, 1-in-100 Year Event in 2007



Source: Tillinghast Towers Perrin, Study of Recent Legislative Changes to Florida's Property Insurance Mechanisms, 3/07.

Savings vs. Costs by Region: Neither Equitable nor Proportionate

TALLAHASSEEAverage Savings: \$20Cost of 1-in-30 Storm: \$2,000Cost is 100 times avg. savings

TAMPA Average Savings: \$100 Cost of 1-in-30 Storm: \$2,300 Cost is 23 times avg. savings STATEWIDE AVERAGE Average Savings: \$265 Cost of 1-in-30 Storm: \$2,550 Cost is 10 times avg. savings

ORLANDO

Average Savings: \$30 Cost of 1-in-30 Storm: \$2,075 Cost is 69 times avg. savings

MIAMI Average Savings: \$1,120 Cost of 1-in-30 Storm: \$3,375 Cost is 3 times avg. savings

Source: Tillinghast Towers Perrin, Study of Recent Legislative Changes to Florida's Property Insurance Mechanisms, 3/07.

Overview of Plans for a National Catastrophe **Insurance** Plan



NAIC's Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan

- Proposes Layered Approach to Risk
- Layer 1: Maximize resources of private insurance & reinsurance industry
 - Includes "All Perils" Policy
 - Encourage Mitigation
 - Create Meaningful, Forward-Looking Reserves
- Layer 2: Establishes system of state catastrophe funds (like FHCF)
- Layer 3: Federal Catastrophe Reinsurance Mechanism

Source: Insurance Information Institute



Source: NAIC, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a Comprehensive National Plan, Dec. 1, 2005; Insurance Information. Inst.

Objectives of NAIC's Comprehensive National Catastrophe Plan

- Should Promote Personal Responsibility Among Policyholders
- Supports Reasonable Building Codes, Development Plans & Other Mitigation Tools
- Maximize the Risk Bearing Capacity of the Private Markets
- Should Provide Quantifiable Risk Management to the Federal Government

Source: NAIC, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a Comprehensive National Plan, Dec. 1, 2005; Insurance Information. Inst.


STATE RESIDUAL MARKETS **Still Growing Despite** a Quiet 2006 iii

Florida Citizens Exposure to Loss (Billions of Dollars)



Source: PIPSO; Insurance Information Institute

Major Residual Market Plan Estimated Deficits 2004/2005 (Millions of Dollars)



* MWUA est. deficit for 2005 comprises \$545m in assessments plus \$50m in Federal Aid. Source: Insurance Information Institute

Recommendations



Recommendations for Controlling Hurricane Exposure

- Raise public awareness of risk
 - > Mandatory risk disclosure in all residential real estate transactions
 - Require signed waivers if decline flood coverage that also waive rights to any and all disaster aid, or
 - Mandate flood coverage
- Continue to strengthen & enforce of building codes
- Allow markets to determine all property insurance rates
 > Role of state focused on difficult-to-insure or income issues
- Increase incentives to mitigate
- Require state-run insurer to charge actuarially sound rates and limit high value exposure
- Require communities/counties to a financial stake in their catastrophe exposure

Reimburse disaster aid to state/federal government



Insurance Information Institute On-Line

WWW.JJ.ORG

If you would like a copy of this presentation, please give me your business card with e-mail address